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Abstract 
The potential links between climate change and conflict have received much attention in recent 
years, but there is little consensus on the issue in the relevant literature. So far, few methodological 
reflections exist in climate-conflict research. This is unfortunate given the tremendous innovations in 
methods the research field has experienced in recent years and the potential of diverse methods to 
shed light on different aspects of the subject matter, thereby increasing our understanding of 
potential climate–conflict links. In order to counteract this shortcoming, this paper provides a 
comprehensive review of the developments and innovations in methods in climate–conflict 
research. It first identifies and discusses the most common methods in the research field: large-N 
statistical analysis and qualitative case study. The paper goes on to evaluate four new methods that 
have emerged particularly since 2012: integration of statistical techniques and qualitative case 
studies; field experiment; risk analysis based on geographical information systems (GIS); and 
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). The review provides an overview of these methods and 
their potentials and pitfalls when used to study climate–conflict links. It also discusses how future 
research can deal with a pluralism of methods in order to gain deeper insights into the relationship 
between climate change and conflict. 
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Introduction 
The potential links between climate change and conflict have attracted much public and political 
attention in recent years. Since 2007, several high-ranking policymakers and institutions have linked 
climate change to societal unrest or even war, and the UN Security Council has held four debates on 
the issue.1 Recently, US president Barack Obama, British Prince Charles and US presidential 
candidate Bernie Sanders, among others, claimed that climate change was among the factors 
triggering the onset of the devastating civil war in Syria.2  
Scholars nowadays largely agree that climate change is unlikely to cause armed conflicts between 
states, at least in the next decades.3 But what about intra-state violent conflict (for the sake of 
simplicity, just termed ‘conflicts’ in the rest of the paper), by far the most prevalent form of violent 
conflict today?4 In theory, it is hypothesized that the predicted impacts of climate change could 
intensify competition for scarce resources (e.g., food, water, land), drive deprived individuals into 
the hands of violence entrepreneurs, fuel anti-state grievances, undermine the governance capacity 
of already weak states, and cause migration and associated conflicts in the receiving areas.5, 6  
Indeed, a meta-analysis of quantitative studies on temperature/precipitation changes and conflict 
concluded that ‘research has successfully established a causal relationship between climate and 
conflict.’7: 7 But when modifying contested elements of this meta-analysis, a collective of prominent 
climate–conflict researchers found ‘no evidence of a convergence of findings on climate variability 
and civil conflict.’8: 394 Also, no consensus has yet been achieved on the impact of freshwater scarcity, 
soil degradation, migration or more frequent/intense natural disasters on violent conflict.9, 10 
Research largely agrees on the conflict-inducing effects of low economic growth11, 12 and rising food 
prices.13, 14 However, the pathways connecting climate change to food prices/economic growth to 
conflict are complex and still far from being well understood.15, 16 Similarly, several recent studies 
highlight the strong context dependency of potential climate–conflict links.17-19 A recent review in 
the pages of this journal thus summarized that climate–conflict research has so far revealed ‘few 
results that are robust across studies.’20: 269  
The aim of this paper is to reflect on the methods used in climate-conflict research. In line with the 
vast majority of studies, it will focus on the links between climate change and violent conflict within 
states or in areas of limited statehood (in other words: conflicts which involve at least one non-state 
actor as a main party). Broadly speaking, one can distinguish between two kinds of empirical studies 
on this issue: those that focus on the direct manifestations of climate change, such as higher 
temperatures and changed precipitation patterns, and those that focus on the (predicted) socio-
environmental impacts of climate change, including mitigation and adaptation efforts. This review 
will discuss both kinds of analyses. However, the latter category of studies will only be included if 
they relate their results explicitly to the research on climate change and conflict.  
Critical voices have claimed that discussions linking climate change to conflict (a) provide 
legitimation resources for the existence of high military budgets or even for militarized 
interventions, (b) depoliticize conflicts by ignoring their political-economic drivers, and (c) facilitate 
Western-style adaptation rather than mitigation.21-24 I find these criticisms insightful, but they are 
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not further discussed in this review unless they explicitly analyze how such discourses (might) affect 
conflict dynamics within states, for instance in Israel25 or Sudan.26, 27 
So far, few methodological reflections (that is, meta-debates about the methods used and their 
appropriateness) exist in the research on climate-conflict links. There have been several calls for 
multi-method research on climate change and conflict.7, 20, 28-31 However, besides being rather 
general, such calls often give implicit or explicit priority to quantitative, statistical methods. Case 
studies are frequently seen as mere supportive tools, while other methods are hardly considered. 
For instance, when Solow called for a more thorough integration of qualitative and quantitative 
methods in climate–conflict research, he stated: ‘The goal of both should be to develop statistical 
models that better reflect the real drivers of civil conflict.’28: 180 In other words, the ultimate research 
goal would be a well-elaborated statistical analysis.  
This is unfortunate given the epistemological and ontological diversity as well as the plurality of 
methods that have emerged in the research field in recent years, but which can also be found in 
peace and conflict studies32 and interdisciplinary climate research.33 Limited diversity of methods has 
been identified as a driver of incomplete or inconsistent empirical findings.34 More comprehensive 
knowledge of issues and developments related to methods should help to improve future research 
on climate change and conflict. 
This review will proceed as follows. In the second section, the two most common methods in 
climate–conflict research are identified and discussed: large-N statistical analysis and qualitative 
case study. More specifically, I will describe the general approach, more recent developments and 
the potentials and pitfalls of each method. The third section introduces four innovative methods 
which have emerged in the research field since 2012. It discusses their potential to study climate–
conflict links: integration of statistical techniques and process tracing, field experiment, risk analysis 
based on geographical information systems (GIS), and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). The 
fourth section discusses ways to productively deal with a pluralism of methods when investigating 
climate–conflict links, while the fifth section concludes the paper. 
 
2 COMMON METHODS IN CLIMATE–CONFLICT RESEARCH 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the methods used in the 76 papers published between 2007 and 
2015 in the field’s top research journals: Climatic Change, Environmental Research Letters, Global 
Environmental Change, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Nature, Nature Climate Change, Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS), Political Geography, and Science. Of 
course, it is never easy to identify the leading journals in a given research area. But these are the 
journals which not only have a high impact factor, but are also most frequently quoted in policy 
reports, academic papers, and conference discussions on climate change and conflict.35, 36 
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Figure 1: Methods used by papers on climate change and conflict published in the research field’s 
top journals, 2007-2015 
As one can easily see, large-N statistical analysis is the dominant method in research on climate 
change and conflict. Around 60% of the studies published in these upper-tier journals on climate–
conflict links use this method, and it is the most common method in all years except 2013. 
Consequently, results based on large-N statistical analysis are also most frequently cited by literature 
reviews and policy reports.36 Theoretical or review articles are the category with the second highest 
number of publications (around 18% of the studies), but do not constitute a genuine method and 
thus receive no further discussion here. The third most frequent method is qualitative case study 
(around 9% of the studies). Qualitative case studies are also very common in papers published 
outside of the top journals, especially in edited volumes.37, 38 Thus, large-N statistical analysis and 
qualitative case study are discussed as the most common methods in climate–conflict research later 
in this section. 
All other methods identified (and discussed in further detail below) were used less frequently in 
papers on climate change and conflict published in the top journals: GIS-based risk analyses account 
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for around 5% of all studies, integrated approaches combining statistical and qualitative field-based 
methods for nearly 4%, QCAs for nearly 3%, and empirical simulation models for slightly more than 
1%. These approaches also tend to play marginal roles in others journals or edited volumes. 
However, climate–conflict research has experienced a notable diversification in methods since 2012. 
Prior to this point, only statistical analyses, qualitative case studies and theory/review articles were 
published in the research field’s high-ranking journals. But from 2012 onward, the journals 
increasingly published studies using other, new methods.  
 
2.1 Large-N statistical analysis 
Studies based on this method use statistical techniques, usually regression analysis, to detect 
correlations (or their absence) between certain manifestations or predicted consequences of climate 
change and some form of conflict. While a few studies analyze single countries,39, 40 most large-N 
statistical analyses in climate–conflict research draw on evidence from various countries (often in 
Africa). These will be at the focus of the subsequent discussion. Large-N statistical analysis is 
characterized by high external validity (generalizability) because its inferences are usually supported 
by a large number of cases with significant variation in the dependent and independent variables. In 
addition, it is likely that a possible link between climate change and conflict is not particularly strong 
compared to other drivers of violent conflict.41, 42 Such a research field favors quantitative cross-case 
methods, which can single out the average impacts of (the anticipated consequences of) climate 
change for a large number of cases.43 
Early large-N statistical analyses of climate–conflict links overwhelmingly used national-level data 
and yearly aggregates while focusing on civil war as the dependent variable.44, 45 But in recent years, 
the research field experienced several innovations in this regard, most of which were stimulated by 
the availability of more and better datasets. Firstly, a growing number of studies draw on 
subnational data and use artificial grid cells42, 46, 47, administrative/socioeconomic areas48, 49 or ethnic 
groups18 as the unit of analysis. Secondly, there is a trend toward temporal disaggregated analyses, 
which use monthly rather than yearly data.50, 51 These are major improvements given that 
national/yearly averages can severely distort causal inferences, for instance when droughts or civil 
violence are confined to certain areas within a country and to certain time periods within a given 
year. Also, climate–conflict links can manifest themselves on different levels (e.g., local, regional, 
national), a fact that statistical analyses can now account for by choosing different degrees of spatial 
disaggregation. 
However, statistical studies using subnational data have difficulty accounting for the fact that 
climate-related conflicts do not necessarily take place where the impacts of climate change are most 
severe. Violent groups might, for instance, decide that it is more promising to start a conflict in areas 
where state presence is weak or where natural resources are still abundant rather than in their 
home areas devastated by drought.52 Using actors or social groups rather than spatial areas as the 
unit of analysis could probably address this problem.53 Similarly, even more than studies using yearly 
aggregates (often lagging by one or two years), statistical analyses of monthly data struggle to 
account for the long-term effects of climate change on conflict. For instance, climate change could 
trigger circular migration (temporary migration out of and back to home areas), which increases 
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certain populations’ exposure to revolutionary discourses over time.54 It is also possible that climate 
change increases resource scarcity, which undermines social cohesion in the long term.55 
A third major improvement in statistical methods is the use of low-level conflicts rather than full-
fledged civil wars as the dependent variable.56, 57 This is in line with significant evidence that 
environment-related conflict ‘tends to be subnational, diffuse, and persistent,’58: 11 and enables 
researchers to uncover the impact of climate change on various types of conflict. But data on small-
scale conflicts tend to be biased and miss a significant number of events in remote and insecure 
areas.9 Another disadvantage might be that the increasing amount of data available on various 
geographical, social and temporal scales and different types of conflict, while enabling more 
differentiated analysis, also complicate efforts draw comparisons across different studies.59, 60 
Fourthly, researchers increasingly consider the indirect effects of climate change on conflict via 
intermediary variables such as food price shocks61 rather than focusing on temperature and 
precipitation changes. Particularly innovative are two-step models, as they allow researchers to 
move away from correlations between two variables and to focus more specifically on the pathways 
connecting climate change to conflict. Recent studies evaluate, for instance, whether climate 
variability is linked to civil conflict via adverse impacts on food security16 or economic growth.15 
Finally, a growing number of studies employ interaction effects or analyze different subsets of their 
samples separately in order to test the hypothesis that climate change is linked to conflict only 
under very specific circumstances.31, 47, 48 
Despite these considerable advantages, large-N statistical analysis still suffers from serious 
shortcomings when investigating climate–conflict links. Even with similar theoretical concepts and 
empirical data, the choice of different statistical models can yield widely diverging results.36 
Furthermore, although two-stage models represent significant progress, statistical studies ultimately 
detect correlations rather than causal links, since ‘we do not have an adequate explanation of the 
phenomenon under study until we can say why the model works.’62: 172  
Statistical analyses are also restricted by the kind of data they can use. For instance, little 
comparable quantitative data exists on (environmental) migration patterns, climate change 
adaptation or mitigation efforts, and local conflict/resource management institutions. All of these 
have been shown to impact conflict dynamics10, 63-65, but are almost completely excluded by 
quantitative studies. Local perceptions of climatic and environmental changes can differ 
considerably from the data provided by Western scientific methods and are important for social 
actions in the respective localities, but can hardly be incorporated into large-N studies.66, 67 The same 
applies to the relevance of identities (Who is included in/excluded from the in-group? Who is an 
enemy/friend?)68 and to place-specific dynamics of capitalist accumulation (Is an actor able to 
manipulate resource access for commercial purposes?).27 Collecting such data for a larger number of 
cases might be possible (though with some limitations), but would be very labor-intensive and can 
(like all academic data gathering) suffer from coding errors and misinformation. Actors which are 
involved in intense conflicts or resource exploitation, for instance, face incentives to manipulate 
reporting patterns.69 
An issue related to data availability is construct validity; that is, does the indicator chosen actually 
measure the theoretical construct under study in the large number of cases analyzed? Several 
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statistical studies of climate–conflict links use data on ethno-political marginalization to 
operationalize local grievances or mobilization opportunities,47, 70 but these are also frequently 
driven by class- or place-based factors rather than by ethnic divides.71, 72 In other words, there are 
serious concerns that statistical analyses of climate–conflict links ignore too much local complexity.  
2.2 Qualitative case study 
Technically speaking, qualitative case study is not a research method but a research design, since it 
does not formulate specific requirements about how data should be collected and analysed.43 Most 
qualitative case studies analyzing the links between climate change and conflict employ one or 
several of three techniques. Firstly, they engage in a form of process tracing to understand the 
causal links (or their absence) connecting a (predicted) manifestation of climate change to collective 
violence.73, 74 Secondly, they gather and analyze data in a less formalized and more ethnographic way 
and condense them to a narrative of climate-conflict links (usually strongly based on the views 
expressed by local inhabitants).75, 76 Finally, studies in the tradition of historical materialism and 
political ecology often resort to the technique of contextualization, that is, they show how relations 
between climate change, environmental stress and conflict are deeply embedded in, and thus 
constituted by broader socio-political structures.77, 78 All these forms of qualitative case studies use 
data from academic, journalistic, government and NGO publications, interviews, participatory 
observation, and/or focus group discussions.  
A major strength of qualitative case studies, especially when they are based on field research, is 
their ability to account for local complexity. They can consider location-specific factors that show 
considerable variation on the micro-level and for which no quantitative data is available, such as 
power relationships among groups or traditional institutions designed to cope with climate extremes 
and intergroup tensions.64, 76, 79 Process tracing and more ethnographic accounts can also consider 
temporally deferred or geographically distant impacts of climate change on conflict. 54, 73 Drawing on 
the idea of contextualization, scholars can pinpoint such wider social, economic and political 
dynamics which are highly relevant for understanding climate-conflict links, but which are easily 
ignored by approaches focusing on the narrow relationships between two variables.80 Examples of 
such macro-variables include international conversation discourses81, global carbon offsetting 
economies78, or even geoengineering.82, 83  
Field-based qualitative studies can detect relevant (combinations of) variables and spatio-temporal 
patterns hardly considered by existing theories and use them to formulate new hypotheses to be 
tested by medium- and large-N approaches. This is especially important in climate–conflict research, 
where many observers still consider existing theoretical models to be too general.29 Process tracing 
(explicitly aiming to analyze the pathways connecting two variables), but also more ethnographic 
analyses are also well suited to identify causality rather than just correlation.  
Qualitative case studies in climate–conflict research have recently begun to draw more strongly on 
constructivist and poststructuralist theory, which assumes that reality cannot be objectively 
accessed, but that perceptions of reality are always filtered by pre-existing, intersubjectively 
established knowledge schemes. Studies inspired by this theoretical background often draw on 
discourse or narrative analysis (based on data gathered during field research) and ask how certain 
actions and events become possible or, to the contrary, remain unimaginable.26, 84-87 These methods 
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are important in addressing the ‘positivist-rationalist bias’ characteristic to statistical analyses, but 
also to many qualitative studies of climate–conflict links.68: 70 Conflict research has shown the 
importance of identities and perceptions in the dynamics of violent conflict,88 while interdisciplinary 
climate researchers emphasize that local knowledge and experiences strongly influence how people 
react to climate change.66, 89 Discourse and narrative analysis allows scholars to draw on these 
insights when studying climate change and conflict.  
Whether they use process tracing, ethnographical approaches, contextualization or discourse 
analysis, qualitative case studies face a set of shared problems in the research field. From a 
pragmatic point of view, good qualitative case studies often require a certain amount of fieldwork, 
for which adequate organizational arrangements, language skills and financial resources are 
necessary. Researchers might also face a lack of personal security when travelling to conflict areas. 
In addition, qualitative studies can hardly account for weak, unobservable links connecting climate 
change to conflict. For instance, higher temperatures are hypothesized to ‘cause increases in 
aggression’90: 37 at the individual level, which could translate into a higher risk of collective violence. 
But a temperature–aggression nexus is very hard to detect by qualitative case studies. Of course, 
this issue is less acute when dealing with the conflict relevance of the indirect consequences of 
climate change, such as water scarcity, food price fluctuations or adaptation projects. Researchers 
also need to be aware that local informants might face incentives to misrepresent certain issues, for 
instance because they try to gather support from various constituencies or because they are afraid 
of their personal security. The literature already discusses several ways to deal with this issues, such 
as collaborating with local researchers or staying in the community for longer time periods.91  
Especially discourse analysis, but at times also techniques of contextualization struggle to clarify the 
relationship between perceived and ‘objective’ environmental problems and injustices. Finally, it 
remains questionable whether inferences can be drawn from a qualitative study of a few locations 
and applied to a wider set of cases (external validity), especially given the low resolution of current 
climate models.92 There are several strategies available for choosing cases in order to increase the 
generalizability of the findings (see below). However, with the exception of some analyses focusing 
on most-likely cases,76, 93 most case studies in climate–conflict research do not elaborate on their 
case selection strategies or simply select on the dependent variable (presence of conflict).  
 
3 NEW METHODS IN CLIMATE-CONFLICT RESEARCH 
In this section, I will discuss four methods that scholars have successfully used to analyze climate–
conflict links in several studies since 2012, and which hold the potential to complement the most 
common methods in the research field. 
3.1 Integration of statistical analyses and case study techniques 
A growing number of studies on climate change and conflict combine case study techniques with 
statistical tools. Such integrated analyses have been conducted for parts of Kenya,94-96 Sudan,97 
Ethiopia,64 Mali98, and Bolivia, Mali, Nicaragua, Vietnam and Zambia.99 Combining these two most 
widely used methods yields a number of advantages in climate–conflict research. Firstly, the number 
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of cases (in the sense of distinct spatio-temporal units such as district years) is usually higher 
(otherwise, statistical techniques would not be feasible). This increases the generalizability of the 
results compared to qualitative case studies.  
Secondly, integrated analyses avoid many of the pitfalls related to data quality and availability from 
which statistical studies suffer. For instance, Benjaminsen et al. and Ember et al. conducted field 
research to collect conflict data from local registers, thus reducing problems associated with biased 
conflict reporting patterns for marginal or insecure areas.94, 98 Similarly, Linke et al. collected and 
analyzed data on individual beliefs about the necessity of using violence, about changes in drought 
patterns and about the quality of communal dialogue, among other variables.95 They were therefore 
able to incorporate local perceptions of environmental changes and conflict realities as well as data 
on local institutions into their analysis. 
Thirdly, qualitative techniques can complement statistical analysis by detecting causal pathways 
indicated by correlations, or else by explaining why these correlations are misleading. To give an 
example: The statistical parts of the studies by Witsenburg and Adano (for Marsabit/Kenya) and by 
De Juan (for Darfur/Sudan) both indicated a robust correlation between higher precipitation rates 
and a higher risk of violent conflict. However, intense qualitative knowledge of the regions led the 
two studies to strongly diverging interpretations of these correlations: Witsenburg and Adano 
concluded that wetter years offer more favorable conditions for violent cattle raids; the authors thus 
remained skeptical about climate–conflict links.96 By contrast, De Juan reasoned that people from 
drought-affected regions in Darfur migrated to areas with sufficient rainfall and vegetation, thus 
intensifying competition and hostilities in wetter areas.97 
Despite their obvious advantages, studies combining statistical and case study techniques are still 
rare in climate–conflict research. One reason for this might be that they are demanding and labor 
intensive, as the same (team of) researchers must skillfully apply both methods and data collection 
on the ground is necessary. Because of this, all of the integrated studies conducted so far focus only 
on sub-regions of certain countries, thus limiting their generalizability and compatibility with global 
climate models. Collecting data from surveys could pose problems if respondents face incentives to 
report selectively. Finally, poststructuralist, feminist and critical scholars are still likely to insist that 
such multi-method studies cannot sufficiently address place-specific belief systems, gender relations 
and political ecologies, thus necessitating the use of methods more sensitive to local contexts and 
their embeddedness in wider political dynamics.27, 65, 100 
3.2 Field experiment 
Originating mainly from the disciplines of economics and social psychology, field experiments have 
recently been used to assess the links between renewable resource scarcity and conflict (and thus 
indirectly between climate change and conflict). Such experiments conduct game theory simulations 
with inhabitants of the area of interest in order to assess which factors influence conflict or 
cooperation over renewable resources101, 102 or whether resource scarcity makes conflict-prone 
individual actions more likely.55, 103 For instance, Prediger et al. compared two regions in Namibia 
with similar political, economic and cultural characteristics, but with strong and stable differences in 
renewable resource scarcity as indicated by biomass production. They found that during their 
10 
 
experiments, inhabitants from the resource-scarce region tended to engage much more often in 
spiteful behavior, thus increasing the likelihood that conflicts would occur.55  
Such studies typically employ statistical methods to analyze quantitative data collected through field 
research. But since their defining characteristic – data collection in the field via simulated games – is 
quite unique, I treat field experiment as a separate category rather than as a subset of the studies 
integrating statistical and case study techniques. 
Field experiments enable researchers to better understand the micro-dynamics of conflicts related 
to climate change. According to the micro-dynamics research paradigm, the ‘problem is not in 
understanding the causes of violence […] but to understand how individuals […] follow different 
trajectories leading to rebellion or not.’104: 161 Field experiments address this question by focusing on 
the drivers of individual decisions. As a method based on game theory, field experiments also enable 
climate–conflict scholars to connect their work more thoroughly with research on the management 
of common pool resources. This seems promising because a wide literature has evaluated how the 
characteristics of natural resources, resource users and resource governance institutions facilitate 
cooperation over natural resources, thus making conflicts less likely.105, 106 Since field experiments 
can be designed to simulate longer periods of resource scarcity, they are also well suited to assess 
the potential impact of climate change on conflict over the medium to long term (rather than with a 
time lag of one or two years, which is typically used by statistical analysis).55, 102 
Even more so than other approaches combining field research and statistical analysis, field 
experiments are rather demanding and usually only conducted for a particular region, which reduces 
generalizability. Moreover, because different studies employ different procedures, the comparability 
of the results is not guaranteed. Field experiments are also criticized for their low external validity; 
that is, people’s actions in experimental contexts may not necessarily resemble their real-life 
behavior.107, 108 Furthermore, field experiments tend to focus almost exclusively on individual 
decisions, while methodological individualism has been criticized in the study of (climate-related) 
violent conflicts.71, 87 Among other issues, the question remains open as to how individual 
preferences in favor of waging violence transform into collective action. 
3.3 GIS-based risk analysis 
In general, risk analysis based on geographic information systems (GIS) assesses the spatial 
distribution of factors that shape the likelihood of an undesirable outcome, such as civil conflict or 
fire disaster.109, 110 In order to do so, such studies identify, combine and visualize (usually 
quantitative) data on the supposed drivers of these outcomes. As early as 2006, Bocchi et al. 
combined spatial data on resource scarcity and human ingenuity and analyzed how they relate to 
the geographical distribution of conflicts in Kenya.111 Drawing on significantly improved datasets, 
recent studies combine climate data with indicators for vulnerability and conflict likelihood to 
identify possible climate-conflict hotspots in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda.41, 112 
GIS-based risk analysis has several advantages, especially in research fields like climate change and 
conflict, which are characterized by a high degree of interdisciplinary and policy relevance. Such risk 
analyses can combine and integrate a range of diverse data and thus account for conditional 
relationships. The produced ‘hotspot maps can help to communicate issues in a manner that may be 
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easier to interpret than text’113: 23, particularly for audiences without a (relevant) academic 
background. GIS-based risk analysis also offers opportunities for fruitful interdisciplinary 
cooperation, as climate scientists can derive data on (future) hazards from climate models, while 
hydrologists, biologists and social scientists provide indicators for vulnerability and conflict risk.114, 115 
As discussed above, elaborate case selection strategies are rarely employed in (comparative) 
qualitative case studies on climate change and conflict. One reason for this might be that it is 
difficult to identify most-likely cases (characterized by a high climate-related conflict risk), least-likely 
cases (characterized by a low climate-conflict risk) or typical cases (characterized by hazard, 
vulnerability and conflict risk that are fairly characteristic of a larger region) before entering the 
field. GIS-based risk analysis has a high potential to improve case selection patterns by characterizing 
various regions through specified risk indices. Finally, GIS-based risk analysis can contribute to the 
improvement of quantitative datasets used in climate–conflict research because ‘visualization can 
help uncover details that would not be visible in the tabular data.’116: 464 That is to say, (combinations 
of) relevant factors can be visualized in the form of maps, which are in turn shared with experts on 
the respective areas or with local inhabitants to discuss issues of data quality and interpretation.41, 
117 
However, GIS-based risk analysis works with the same quantitative data as statistical models. It is 
therefore characterized by similar problems regarding sensitivity to local contexts, data availability, 
data quality and construct validity.113 And on their own, such risk analyses are rather descriptive 
because they primarily combine, integrate and visualize data. This can be an important contribution 
when it comes to checking data quality or selecting cases, but it tells us little about the links between 
climate change and conflict (or their absence) themselves. 
3.4 Qualitative comparative analysis 
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is based on set theory and often considered an intermediary 
between qualitative and quantitative methods. It requires researchers to decide for each variable 
whether a case belongs to the set of cases where this variable is present (calibrated as 1) or not 
(calibrated as 0). More elaborate versions of QCA allow for in-between values or multiple (rather 
than binary) sets. After all cases are calibrated with regard to all variables, a logical minimization 
procedure based on Boolean algebra detects whether a (combination of) conditions (~independent 
variables) is necessary or sufficient for the outcome of interest (~dependent variable) to occur.118 
Only in 2015 were the first two analyses using QCA in this research field published. Based on a 
sample of 31 resource-scarce countries and quantitative indicators, Bretthauer studied the 
circumstances under which water and land scarcity facilitate violent conflict.119 Ide drew on evidence 
from 20 qualitative case studies to investigate why conflicts over renewable resources escalate into 
violence.17 A recent study used QCA to investigate the conflict-relevance of dam projects in Asia, 
which are considered as climate change mitigation efforts.120 
In theoretical terms, QCA is based on the assumption of conjunctural causation. In other words, it is 
possible and even likely that conditions have no independent effect on the outcome; their impact 
only occurs in conjunction with other conditions.118 Consequentially, QCA is well suited to uncover 
causal links between a condition and an outcome that are strongly dependent on the presence or 
absence of several (combinations of) context factors. This makes the method very suitable for the 
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research field, as potential climate–conflict links are hypothesized to manifest themselves only 
under very specific circumstances.121 Furthermore, QCA is able to distinguish among several causal 
pathways and among necessary, sufficient and irrelevant conditions for a certain outcome, which 
increases its potential to disentangle complex links in climate–conflict research. Another major 
strength of QCA is that quantitative data (e.g., on temperature changes or casualties) and qualitative 
data (e.g., on local perceptions or power relationships) can be combined in the same analysis by the 
calibration procedure. 
However, so far, only the study of Kirchherr, Charles and Walton has utilized the latter advantage.120 
Thus, QCA’s potential to bridge quantitative and qualitative approaches in the research field still lies 
idle. Furthermore, in comparison to other methods, QCA can only take a limited number of causal 
conditions into account. Marx and Dusa found that QCAs processing binary data need at least twenty 
cases for an analysis with five conditions; otherwise, random patterns might appear as robust 
results.122 This problem is aggravated by the fact that QCA is best suited to handle a medium or 
moderately large number of cases.123 This could potentially reduce the generalizability of QCA results 
compared to statistical analysis. Under certain circumstances, QCA practitioners recommend 
drawing on empirically unobserved cases and theoretical knowledge in order to yield more 
parsimonious results during the minimization procedure. This practice has been criticized in 
general124, but it seems especially problematic in a research field like climate change and conflict, 
where there is so far little consensual theoretical knowledge. Finally, like other methods in the 
research field, QCA can suffer from measurement errors, biases in the data used, and (if using a 
larger number of cases) a lack of sensitivity to the local context.125 
 
4 TOWARD A PLURALISM OF METHODS IN CLIMATE-CONFLICT RESEARCH 
The developments discussed above seem to indicate that the research field is becoming more 
pluralistic in terms of methods. Given the significant potentials and pitfalls of the various methods, 
research on climate change and conflict would profit from welcoming and cultivating this trend. If 
such a pluralism can accommodate strongly positivist as well as critical and poststructuralist 
methods, it would enable the research field to compensate for the shortcomings of the individual 
methods. It would also allow scholars to account for the full spectrum of theoretically relevant 
variables, ranging from global mitigation strategies to regional precipitation changes to local identity 
constructions. Such a pluralism can be pursued via two, mutually not-exclusive pathways: 
integration and dialogue. 
The first pathway refers to the combination and integration of various methods in one or several 
related research projects. For instance, one could conduct a GIS-based risk analysis (drawing on the 
results of past studies) in order to map the locations that are most likely to suffer from climate-
related conflicts in the past years. This map, complemented by data on actual conflicts, would be a 
suitable tool to select cases for further in-depth qualitative studies. Promising case selection 
strategies include the study of deviant cases (strongly deviating from established theoretical 
knowledge), most-likely cases (where climate–conflict links are most likely to be found), diverse 
cases (showing strong variation with regard to climate change impacts, conflict and relevant context 
variables), most-similar cases (similar with regard to all variables except for the conflict outcome and 
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one or a few context factors of interest), most-different cases (different with regard to all variables 
except for one or a few relevant context factors and the conflict outcome), or a mixture of these.126  
The case studies should be based on field research and, ideally, draw on multiple techniques, such as 
process tracing, contextualization, ethnography, discourse analysis, or field experiments. Ideally, 
several case studies should be conducted using a coherent case selection strategy and a similar 
research design. The cases could then be compared by means of QCA, drawing on quantitative and 
qualitative data. This would open up several avenues for further research. Complex causal pathways 
indicated by the QCA and the case studies could, for example, provide interaction terms or two-step 
models to be used in statistical analysis, but inspire new qualitative case studies as well. The results 
could also feed into a GIS-based analysis, which is discussed with local stakeholders and research 
partners in order to (a) share insights gained with local partners and (b) receive additional 
information and feedback, for instance by using participatory mapping approaches.117, 127 
But the idea of an integration of diverse methods is not free of problems. For one, the more 
methods are employed in a given project, the bigger the team of researcher has to be as a single 
scholar is unlikely to have advanced knowledge of, say, QCA, discourse analysis, and GIS applications. 
The same is true for the audience of the research results, which needs to be familiarized with various 
methods. Research teams (but also individual researchers) could also face high transaction costs 
when they have to “translate” between the logics and results of various methods. This is especially 
challenging as different methods are frequently based on different epistemological, ontological and 
axiological assumptions. To give an example: Statistical analyses aim to predict patterns of an 
objectively measureable reality in a value-free way by analyzing a large-number of randomly chosen 
cases, while discourse analyses usually promote engaged research, choose one or few cases on 
purpose, highlight the existence of several socially constructed worlds, and thus insists that 
prediction is neither possible nor desirable.128, 129 
Proponents of this “incompatibility thesis”129: 270 would thus opt for dialogue, the second pathway to 
a pluralism of methods in climate-conflict research. Pursuing this pathway would imply that climate-
conflict researchers are much more engaged in exchanging about the assumptions, implications, 
strengths and weaknesses of their respective methods (and the associated epistemologies, 
ontologies, and axiologies), rather than just issuing vague calls for multi-method research or 
discussing ways to improve large-N studies.28 But while doing so, they would avoid some of the 
incompatibilities and transaction costs associated with an integration of various methods in a single 
research design. However, such a dialogue pathway faces its own risks, as dialogue might be 
hampered by the fact that most researchers are only familiar with one tradition of methods, while 
several scholars underscore the high potential of combining seemingly contradictory methods.129 
 
Conclusion 
Motivated by the claims (a) that the research field recently experienced tremendous developments 
in methods, (b) that limited diversity and reflection of methods can hamper research progress, and 
(c) that many discussions about methods in the field focus primarily on ways to improve statistical 
analyses, the goal of this paper was to review and evaluate developments in methods in climate–
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conflict research. In order to do so, I first identified and discussed the two most common methods in 
the research field. Then, I focused on four new methods that have gained prominence since 2012. 
Finally, the paper discussed how future research can deal with a pluralism of methods, as there is no 
‘silver bullet method,’ no single method superior to all others in research on climate change and 
conflict. 
One task for future research is thus to refine existing methods and to explore new (combinations of) 
methods for investigating climate–conflict links. For instance, while several studies have used formal 
models as a heuristic device,130, 131 it would be interesting to explore the utility of empirical models in 
climate–conflict research. So far, only one study has used this approach.132 Especially agent-based 
models could draw on the results of field experiments. Like formal models, more elaborate scenario 
techniques can be used to investigate the conflict relevance of climate change consequences for 
which few historical precedents exist.133 Consider, for example, disputes over shipping, fishing and 
oil/gas development in a melting Arctic134 or large-scale adaptation and geoengineering projects.63, 83 
Approaches such as participatory observation and participatory mapping135 would enable research 
to shed more light on the highly context-sensitive meanings and micro-dynamics of human reactions 
to environmental changes (including conflict and cooperation).  
As the use of multiple methods (accommodating various epistemological and ontological 
approaches) enriches our understanding of the subject, climate–conflict researchers are encouraged 
to draw on (and probably combine) the many methods that have become available in the research 
field in recent years, or that remain to be explored in the future. Although they are valuable 
instruments, large-N statistical analyses will have to lose some of their dominance in favor of a more 
balanced method mix. In any case, making use of the complementarities and synergies among 
various ‘research methods requires an understanding of the relative comparative advantages, trade-
offs, and limitations of each method and an ability to translate between different methods.’136: 19 
Hopefully this paper has contributed to generating such an understanding in the research on climate 
change and conflict. 
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